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1.  The Japanese Employment System
(What is the Japanese employment system?)
Lifetime employment and seniority-based wages are prominent features 
of employment practices in Japan. Lifetime employment means that workers 
continue to work at the same firms during their working lives. Under senior-
ity-based wages, employees earn higher wages as they get older. Promotion 
is often based on seniority as well. Accordingly, firms need to terminate 
employment at a certain age to contain the expansion of wage costs and thus 
they adopt mandatory retirement for their employees. Mandatory retirement 
age used to be 55 years old, but now the majority of firms have mandatory 
retirement at the age of 60⑴.
The above discussion indicates that mandatory retirement is closely 
linked with lifetime employment and seniority-based wages. All in all, lifetime 
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employment, seniority-based wages and mandatory retirement are three pil-
lars of the so-called Japanese employment system. In addition, enterprise-
based labor unions are often regarded as important part of the Japanese 
employment system, but this paper examines Japanese-style working condi-
tions and thus focuses on the above-mentioned three key features. This 
distinctive employment system had evolved and been most pronounced dur-
ing Japan’s rapid growth era of the 1950s through the early 1970s⑵.
It is important to note that the Japanese employment system has long 
been most salient for university-educated male workers employed by large 
firms. Most female workers and workers at small firms have not necessarily 
been under the Japanese employment system. They change jobs more often 
and their wages do not rise much as they get older. And many of very small 
firms do not have mandatory retirement and keep older workers at work-
places.
Two caveats are in order. First, “lifetime” of lifetime employment does 
not literally mean the lifespan of an employee, but rather it means employ-
ment continues until mandatory retirement. Second, mandatory retirement is 
not mandated by law or some government regulations. As with lifetime 
employment and seniority-base wages, it is a private sector practice, with 
individual firms having their own mandatory retirement schemes. Some 
firms, though rather a rarity, do not have mandatory retirement.
Obvious advantages of the Japanese employment system include the 
accumulation of skills within firms and the long-term, royal commitments of 
workers to their firms. In particular, firms can provide workers with costly 
─────────────────
⑴　As many firms shifted their mandatory retirement age from 55 to 60 in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the government introduced a legislation prohibiting firms from setting it at younger than age 60 
at the end of the 1990s with the aim of ensuring longer employment. Now the majority of firms 
adopting mandatory retirement set the retirement age at 60 and firms with mandatory retire-
ment at older than 60 are rare.
⑵　There were some incipient Japanese employment system at a small number of very large 
firms after the end of the World War I. Some researchers are of the view that the tight state 
controls on employment and wages during the World War II sowed the seed for the post-war 
evolution of the Japanese employment system.
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trainings, both in-house programs and external education (sending them to 
expensive business schools, for instance), knowing they will stay with the 
same firms⑶. With such trainings and frequent rotation of assignments within 
the firms, workers accumulate versatile skills useful for their firms in the 
long run. Secure long-term employment along with training opportunities 
motivate workers to be diligent in their work efforts and climb up the corpo-
rate ladder. Seniority-based wages offer incentives for workers stay at the 
same firms, because workers are paid less than their productivity or contri-
butions to the firms while young and receive more in later years and thus 
they would lose money by quitting at mid-career. To put it another way, 
seniority-based wages can be viewed as deferred wage payments over the 
work-life period.
On the other hand, the Japanese employment system do have some dis-
advantages for both firms and workers. It tends to hobble firms when they 
need to flexibly adjust employment and wage costs in times of corporate dis-
tress. The problem for workers is that it is difficult for mid-career job 
changers to find suitable jobs since firms adopting lifetime employment prac-
tices favor hiring fresh graduates. As the Japanese economy has undergone 
slower and sometimes negative growth and global competition has been ever 
intensifying, the traditional employment practices have started eroding, if not 
crumbling, over the past few decades. Japan now needs greater labor market 
flexibility with which firms are able to respond to changing business condi-
tions by adjusting employment and wages more flexibly and workers are able 
to change jobs more easily.
─────────────────
⑶　Theoretically, there are two types of training; firm-specific and general training. Firm-specific 
training is useful only for the firm in question so that firms have incentives to provide their work-
ers with such training. By contrast, firms are less inclined to offer general training that enhances 
workers’ skills useful anywhere, for fear that workers acquiring higher skills might quit. Under 
lifetime employment, firms are thought to be better positioned to offer general training to their 
workers as well as firm-specific training. In practice, however, it is very difficult to tell two types 
of training apart.
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(Changes in lifetime employment and seniority-based wages)
To see where Japanese employment system stands now, let us first com-
pare Japan’s situations with those in other major countries in recent years. 
Begin with lifetime employment. Average job tenure provides a useful indica-
tion of how widespread the lifetime employment practice is in Japan. Figure 
1 shows average job tenure for workers aged 55-64 in major countries, 
namely how long is the average length of service of older workers for the 
current employers. Job tenure in Japan is a little shorter than in continental 
Europe in recent years. Note that this statistic is for male and female work-
ers combined. A gender-based statistic indicates that job tenure of older male 
workers in Japan is likely to exceed that in continental Europe⑷. By contrast, 
the U.S. and Britain have much shorter job tenure, indicating that Anglo 
Saxon workers change jobs more frequently than workers in Japan and conti-
nental Europe. Another supporting evidence for Japan’s longer employment 
Figure 1   How Long Older Workers Working at the Same Firms
̶Average Job Tenure of Workers Aged 55-64̶
(Years)
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Labor International Comparison 2013”
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at the same firms is that Japanese workers change jobs less frequently than 
other major countries.
As noted above, long-tern employment in Japan is more prominent for 
men than women. Furthermore, it features most prominently for workers 
employed by large firms. A recent study shows that, in 2009, as many as two-
thirds of workers aged 55-59 at firms with more than 1,000 employees had 
been there for at least 30 years.
Now let’s turn to seniority-based wages. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between wages and job tenure in Japan and other major countries. A sharper 
slope indicates that workers earn higher wages as they serve longer at the 
same firms, and thus, in short, seniority matters more for how much workers 
earn. For male workers, Japan stands out with a sharper slope, which means 
that Japanese male workers are more seniority-based than those in other 
major countries. The wages of Japanese female workers also rise as they 
work longer at the same firms, but the slope for Japanese women is much 
flatter than their male counterparts and does not differ much from women in 
other countries. In sum, as with lifetime employment, seniority-based wages 
is more pronounced for Japanese men than women.
So much for international comparison. The next question is how Japan’s 
lifetime employment and seniority-base wages have evolved over time. To 
say the conclusion first, both lifetime employment and seniority-based wages 
have become less prominent, if not disappearing, over the past few decades.
Since university-educated male workers at large firms have been at the 
heart of the Japanese employment system, historical developments in their 
job tenure and age-earnings profile are useful indications of changes in life-
time employment and seniority-based wages. The average job tenure of those 
─────────────────
⑷　In 2011, the average job tenure for male workers of all age groups is 13.3 years in Japan, longer 
than in continental Europe (11.8 years in Germany, 11.9 years in France and 12.4 years in Italy), 
not to mention the U.S. (4.7 years) and Britain (9.1 years). In contrast, the average job tenure for 
female workers in Japan is shorter than in continental Europe but longer than in the U.S. and 
Britain.
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Figure 2   Relation between Wage and Seniority
(a) Tenure-Earnings Proﬁle for Men
(b) Tenure-Earnings Proﬁle for Women
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workers aged 55-59 has been trending down since the end of the 1990s, indi-
cating that the lifetime employment practice has been gradually fading (see 
Figure 3). There are also some, albeit modest, signs that those workers in 
their thirties have changed their jobs more frequently in recent years. In the 
past, young white-collar workers at large firms tended to stay with the same 
firms because of higher job security and seniority-based wages, but now 
there seems greater labor mobility among them.
Seniority-based wages, another pillar of the Japanese employment sys-
tem, have become less pronounced as well. To see this, the changes in the 
age-earnings profile of university-educated male workers at large firms are 
examined. Note that the age-earnings profile is an important gauge for senior-
ity-based wages, because it shows how much more wages workers earn as 
they grow older and gain more seniority. In Japan, wages rise sharply as 
workers age, reaching a peak at the age group of 50-54. Then, they decline 
Figure 3   How Long Educated Males Stay Put
̶Average Job Tenure of University-Educated Males at Large Firms̶
(Years)
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rather significantly as workers reach the late fifties and sixties. Over the past 
few decades, there have been noticeable changes in the age-earnings profile 
of university-educated male workers at large firms (see Figure 4). The 
upward slope of their profile has become increasingly less steep, meaning 
that the seniority-based wage practice has been waning. Wages of those 
workers aged 50-54 had continued to peak over time among all age groups. 
Yet their peak wages had declined by 22% relative to wages of the youngest 
workers from 1981 to 2012.
(Mandatory retirement still much in place)
While lifetime employment and seniority-based wages have featured less 
and less prominently over the past few decades, there have been small, if 
any, changes in mandatory retirement practices. In 2012, 99.3% of large firms 
employing more than 1,000 workers had mandatory retirement rules, 
although this ratio was slightly down from almost 100% in 2005. In other 
Figure 4   Seniority-Based Wages Becoming Less Prominent
̶Age-Earnings Profile of University-Educated Males at Large Firms̶
(Earnings)
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words, only about 1% of large firms now has a policy of keeping workers 
regardless of age. Among large firms instituting mandatory retirement, most 
(93%) of them put older workers out to grass at the age of 60⑸.
As the pensionable age has been raised in stages from 60 years old to 65, 
the government has recently mandated firms to keep employing older work-
ers up to the age of 65. In response, most of firms now employ older workers 
at workplaces until age 65 with much lower pays on a one-year contract 
basis, rather than extending the age of mandatory retirement. It looks as if 
mandatory retirement practices are very much entrenched.
A main reason for the unvarying mandatory retirement is that wages for 
older workers are hard to cut flexibly since seniority-based wages remain in 
place, though becoming less prominent than before. Accordingly, firms need 
to terminate employment of older workers at the age of mandatory retire-
ment and reemploy them as contract workers to substantially reduce wage 
costs. In other words, it seems that maintaining seniority-based wages 
requires mandatory retirement in place.
Another important reason for little change in mandatory retirement lies 
with tight restrictions on the dismissal of regular workers. In Japan, it is very 
difficult for firms to fire workers unless they are bankrupt or near bankrupt. 
Firms therefore are unwilling to extend the age of mandatory retirement 
because doing so would tie their hands in adjusting employment flexibly if 
need be. This issue of stiff employment protection for regular workers will be 
discussed in detail in the following topic on the rising dualism between regu-
lar and non-regular workers, because the onerous restrictions on dismissing 
regular workers have driven firms to use more non-regular workers. Relax-
ing conditions on worker dismissal is needed for both extending work life for 
─────────────────
⑸　There is a modest tendency that the smaller the size of firms, the more firms do away with 
mandatory retirement. 89.8% of firms employing 30-99 workers have mandatory retirement in 
2012, as compared with 99.3% of firms employing more than 1,000 workers. Although the data on 
firms employing less than 30 are not available, it is likely that many of such small firms do not 
have mandatory retirement.
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the elderly and redressing the predicaments of non-regular workers.
(Keeping older people at workplaces)
Rapid aging calls for changes in the Japanese employment system. The 
pensionable age has now been bringing forward from age 60 to 65 as part of 
pension reform. Although no decision has as yet been made, it is imperative 
to bring forward the pensionable age even further preferably to age 70 in 
order to make the public pensions sustainable in the long run. Mandating 
firms to continue to employ older workers would be no longer a viable option 
since it would put onerous burdens on firms, weakening Japanese businesses. 
Instead of trying to preserve lifetime employment and mandatory retirement, 
what is needed is to overhaul the Japanese employment system to meet the 
challenges of aging.
The government ought to consider banning mandatory retirement by 
law so that able older workers could continue to be employed irrespective of 
age. In this connection, the U.S. has long since banned mandatory retirement 
on the ground of unfair discrimination by age. Britain has recently illegalized 
mandatory retirement in order to cope with aging, though aging in Britain is 
less severe than in Japan. A ban on mandatory retirement, if introduced, 
would prompt fundamental changes in Japan’s labor market.
First, seniority-based wages would become untenable and the pay scale 
should be based on workers’ abilities rather than seniority and age. As previ-
ously noted, seniority-based wages and mandatory retirement are closely 
interrelated so that firms would be forced to change seniority-based wages if 
mandatory retirement is prohibited.
Second, stiff restrictions on terminating regular employment would need 
to be relaxed. When firms are required to keep regular workers on the pay-
roll once hired, they would need mandatory retirement to terminate 
employment of high-cost older workers.
Third, labor market flexibility would become even more important when 
the Japanese employment system fades out. Older workers whom their 
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employers judge as expendable would be asked to leave their jobs, while oth-
ers worth their salt could continue to work at the same firms however old 
they are. More workers, young and old alike, would likely lose jobs as restric-
tions on firing are relaxed. Young workers would be tempted to seek better 
opportunities by changing jobs as the slope of age-earnings profile gets less 
steep. Accordingly, it is of great importance for those who face employment 
separation for whatever reasons to be able to find other employment oppor-
tunities as smoothly as feasible. To this end, deregulation in the labor market 
matters. It should be noted that the relaxation of the stiff restrictions on fir-
ing would lead to more involuntary job separations for workers, but at the 
same time would encourage firms to hire new workers because firms know 
they could adjust employment more easily at difficult times. This point will 
be discussed further in connection with non-regular workers in the next sec-
tion.
2.  Growing Labor-Market Dualism
(Regular vs. non-regular workers)
Of much concern regarding today’s labor market is the growing dualism 
between regular and non-regular workers. Regular workers are full-time 
employees whose contractual employment period is unspecified and can work 
until the above-mentioned mandatory retirement. Non-regular workers are a 
mixed bag including part-timers who are mostly housewives, working stu-
dents doing hourly-paid simple jobs, dispatched workers and fixed-term 
workers. Dispatched workers are persons employed by temporary staffing 
agencies and sent to firms to work on a fixed-term basis, while fixed-term 
workers are directly employed by firms. Unlike regular workers, non-regular 
workers have fixed-term contracts of some sort.
Since the late 1990s, non-regular employment has steadily been increas-
ing while regular employment in decline. Non-regular workers accounted for 
34.3% of all workers employed by firms in 2010, rising from 20.9% in 1995 (see 
Figure 5). Traditionally, most of them used to be part-timers and working 
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students, and their aim of working was typically to supplement bread-earn-
ers’ incomes. In recent years, however, non-regular full-time workers in their 
twenties and thirties have been on the rise, and most of them are employed 
as dispatched workers, fixed-term workers or hourly-paid low-skilled work-
ers. Since their jobs are easier to terminate than regular workers, they are 
the first to let go when firms need to shed jobs⑹. In fact, in the midst of the 
deep recession caused by the global financial crisis in 2008-09, wide-spread 
job termination of dispatched workers and other non-regular workers by 
hardest-hit manufacturers caused outcries, prompting the national and local 
Figure 5   Non-Regulars Replacing Regulars
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─────────────────
⑹　Dispatched workers are employed by temporary staffing agencies, not by the firms they work. 
Temporary staffing agencies and firms using dispatched workers have fixed-term contracts 
which are renewable, so that firms can easily let go dispatched workers, if needed, at the end of 
contractual periods (several months or one year). Fixed-term workers are employed by firms and 
their contracts are for less than three years (regulated by law) and renewable. Thus, fixed-term 
workers are also easy to let go.
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governments and NGOs to scramble to extend help.
There seem a variety of reasons for the recent rise in non-regular 
employment. Among others, the following factors are particularly important. 
First, as the economy has remained stagnant and sometimes volatile for the 
better part of the past two decades, firms have become increasingly cautious 
in hiring regular workers and instead preferred to use non-regular workers 
in order to gain higher flexibility in employment. Put it another way, firms 
hedge against uncertainty in business conditions by using non-regular work-
ers to enhance employment flexibility and non-regular workers are in effect a 
buffer for protecting regular workers’ jobs.
Second, ever-intensifying global competition has compelled firms to 
employ non-regular workers whose wage costs are lower. Especially, manu-
facturing firms have responded to low-cost production in emerging market 
countries by not only curving wage costs for their domestic production activi-
ties but also shifting production to those countries.
Third, during the 1990s through the early 2000s, the government deregu-
lated in stages tight restrictions on the temporary staffing industry. In 
particular, in 2004, the ban on dispatching workers to manufacturing firms 
was lifted and many manufactures had since expanded the use of dispatched 
workers at their factories until the global financial crisis broke out in 2008.
(The plight of young non-regular workers)
It should be noted that many of non-regular workers prefer their job sta-
tus as people’s preference as to how they work has become increasingly 
diverse. For example, married women who just want to earn supplemental 
incomes for their families and older persons who are receiving pension bene-
fits may want to have part-time jobs. Some people prefer to work as 
dispatched workers or fixed-term workers because regular employment often 
comes with heavy pressure, long working hours and frequent transfers to 
other offices and factories.
For all the diversified preferences concerning how to work in today’s 
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Japan, the problem is that an increasing number of young people work as 
such non-regular workers as dispatched workers, fixed-term workers and 
hourly-paid workers, simply because they could not and cannot find regular 
worker jobs. Japan’s labor market is virtually segmented between regular 
and non-regular workers, and non-regular employment is not a pathway to 
regular employment.
In 1995, one in ten workers aged 25-34 was non-regular workers, and the 
ratio had rose to one in four in 2010. According to recent surveys, half of dis-
patched workers and half of fixed-term workers see their job status as 
involuntary, aspiring to get regular-worker jobs. Shifting from non-regular to 
regular status is indeed difficult, and persons who start out involuntarily as 
non-regular workers after finishing school are likely stuck with the same job 
status.
Their non-regular status entails some significant disadvantages. First, 
their job security is tenuous. It cannot be avoided for some firms to make 
employment adjustments as business conditions change. Since regular work-
ers are heavily protected and hard to dismiss particularly at large firms, non-
regular workers almost always bear the brunt of job cuts even if they 
perform better than some of regular workers.
Second, the wages of non-regular workers who perform the same works 
as regular workers at the same firms are generally lower than those of regu-
lar workers. Moreover, age-earnings profile of non-regular workers is much 
flatter than that of regular workers, so that lifetime incomes of non-regular 
workers become significantly lower.
Third, non-regular workers tend to have smaller chances to receive firm-
provided training, because the short tenure of non-regular workers reduces 
the incentive for firms to invest in training them. As a consequence, they 
have a disadvantage in enhancing their human capital or wage-earning 
power. All in all, the current two-tire workforces in Japan are indeed prob-
lematical.
In response to the wide-spread job losses of dispatched workers during 
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the deep recession triggered by the global financial crisis, the government of 
the left-leaning Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) grabbing power from the 
long-ruling, conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009 tried to 
undo deregulation on dispatched workers and impose tight limits on the use 
of dispatched workers by firms. Its attempt did not materialize after all, how-
ever, thanks to strong objections by the LDP and the business community. In 
times of economic crises like the global financial crisis, dispatched workers 
and other non-regular workers may lose jobs on a massive scale. What is 
needed is to extend the social safety network such as jobless benefits and 
provision of shelters to non-regular workers. In fact, various measures to 
enhance the access to the social safety net for non-regular workers were 
taken in the wake of the global financial crisis⑺. Restricting the labor-market 
flexibility by banning the use of dispatched workers would not increase the 
hiring of regular workers, but rather stunt overall employment.
(What to do with the labor-market dualism?)
Knee-jerk responses to a crisis would not be productive. Instead, funda-
mental reforms to Japan’s labor market are needed to ameliorate the growing 
dichotomy dividing regular and non-regular workers.
First and foremost, relaxing heavy employment protection for regular 
workers is instrumental in reducing the firms’ growing reliance on non-regu-
lar workers as a means for employment adjustment. Heavy protection of 
regular workers discourages firms to hire regular workers, and instead firms 
are encouraged to use non-regular workers who are easy to let go if and 
when needed. If firms can dismiss regular workers more easily, of course 
with proper financial compensations, they would be encouraged to hire regu-
lar workers.
It should be noted that strict rules restricting worker dismissals by firms 
─────────────────
⑺　For instance, the law providing for unemployment insurance was revised in 2009 and 2010 to 
relax the eligibility conditions on the duration of employment prior to job separation from more 
than one year to more than one month.
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had been developed by judicial law or judge-made law since the 1950s 
through the 1970s. The accumulation of court decisions on labor cases, which 
were based on some general legal principles like prohibition of the abuse of 
right rather than labor laws in existence, has become judicial law on worker 
dismissal. Judicial law has been more stringent on dismissal of workers due 
to economic conditions than firing due to worker-specific reasons like incom-
petence and absenteeism. Namely, it is very difficult for firms to shed their 
workforce when they are under distress due to recession, intensified competi-
tion, or some technological changes.
In contrast, the Labor Standards Act, a primary labor law enacted right 
after the World War II, does not impose particularly onerous restrictions on 
firing workers. The law only stipulates that firms must give prior notice of 30 
days or pay 30 days of wage to workers when they terminate, for whatever 
reasons, employment of workers. No mandatory severance pay is required by 
law. Now a new labor law enacted in the late 2000s has incorporated the rule 
on worker dismissal developed by afore-mentioned court decisions. However, 
this new law only sets out a broad principle and does not tell specific condi-
tions under which worker dismissal is rendered legal or illegal⑻. After all, it 
seems as if judges remained the one who call the shot.
If a sacked worker sues his or her firm for unfair firing, the firm is likely 
to lose. Although firms might win, the unpredictability of court decisions on 
dismissal of workers and high costs associated with court battles and even-
tual losses work in effect as near-prohibition on firing regular workers, 
discouraging firms to increase regular employment. In short, the difficulty of 
firing incumbent regular workers deters hiring new ones. Thus, relaxing the 
existing tight rules on dismissal of regular workers is expected to lead to the 
─────────────────
⑻　The Labor Contract Act enacted in 2007 stipulates “A dismissal shall, if it lacks objectively rea-
sonable grounds and is not considered to be appropriate in general societal terms, be treated as 
an abuse of right and be invalid.” Yet, this law offers no further elaboration as to what would 
constitute lacking “objectively reasonable grounds” or not being “considered to be appropriate in 
general societal terms.”
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switch from non-regular employment to regular employment.
Second, it is important to ensure “equal pay for equal work” for all work-
ers, not least non-regular workers. There have been measurable wage gaps 
between regular and non-regular workers, even after taking into consider-
ation the differences in educational attainment and experiences. When it 
comes to certain types of part-timers, firms are now required by law to abide 
by the “equal pay for equal work” rule. Effective enforcement of “equal pay 
for equal work” for dispatched workers and fixed-term workers is called for⑼.
Here are two footnotes on the above-mentioned difficulty with firing. 
First, the stiff protection for job security is largely limited to workers 
employed by large firms. Smaller firms and foreign subsidiaries often termi-
nate employment relatively easily pursuant to the Labor Standards Act. 
Why? Suing your employer is costly in terms of money and time. Workers at 
large firms can afford to bear such costs often with the backing of enterprise-
based labor unions. However, workers at smaller firms typically cannot. 
Workers at foreign firms tend to change jobs rather frequently, so that they 
just try to find jobs elsewhere when fired rather than expending time and 
energy to take the matter to court.
The second footnote on employment adjustment is that when a large 
firm needs to shed jobs for restructuring, it usually resorts to voluntary job 
buyout by which firms offer their employees a voluntary job separation pack-
age accompanied by extra severance pays. From firms’ viewpoints, voluntary 
job buyout has some disadvantages compared with outright dismissal. A firm 
undertaking voluntary job buyout announces its goal for job reduction but it 
─────────────────
⑼　The law of part-time workers revised in 2007 inhibits violation of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work for certain types of part-timers who are subject to the same job requirements as reg-
ular workers. For other part-timers, equal pay for equal work is a non-binding rule for employers. 
The law of dispatched workers revised in 2012 stipulates that the temporary staff agencies are 
required, in determining wages of dispatched workers, to take account of the balance between 
regular and dispatched workers performing similar works. Yet, this is not quite an effectively 
enforfable rule of equal pay for equal work for dispatched workers. One of the contentious issues 
is that it is often difficult to identify unfair wages because the quality of workers differs.
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is unpredictable how many workers take the offer. A case in point is Japan 
Airline, once the country’s flag-carrier, which filed for bankruptcy in 2010. As 
part of its restructuring efforts involving terminating many unprofitable 
routes, the firm offered a voluntary job buyout plan with a goal of reducing 
16,000 workers, yet workers taking this offer turned out to be less than 10% 
of the job-reduction goal. Then, the firm pressed to curtail its bloated work-
force dismissed some 160 pilots, flight attendants and other workers, most of 
whom subsequently sued the bankrupt firm placed under receivership, claim-
ing that its earnings had been recovering and so the dismissal was 
unwarranted⑽. Another drawback of voluntary job buyout, from firms’ view-
point, is that firms cannot choose whose jobs are terminated. A former CEO 
of Sony often grumbled that, in the company’s past voluntary job buyouts, 
many able and promising employees whom managers wanted to retain took 
the offers and left the firm.
(Decline in working hours)
Very long working hours used to characterize Japan’s workplace. In fact, 
at the beginning of the 1990s, the average annual hours worked exceeded 
2,000 hours, far higher than that in other major countries (see Figure 6). Over 
the past two decades, the average annual hours worked of Japanese workers 
have significantly declined. Now, it is largely comparable with that of Ameri-
can workers, yet workers in major European countries work for much 
shorter time. In particular, German workers on average toil at their work-
places for 18% less time than Japanese workers in a year. The upshot is that 
Japan’s long working hours have become no longer conspicuous, but Japanese 
workers still expend longer time at workplaces than European workers.
Japanese workers work for longer hours because working overtime is 
the norm rather than the exception at many Japanese workplaces. Another 
─────────────────
⑽　The case is still pending in court as of the writing of this book. In 2012, a regional court dis-
missed the claims of the dismissed workers, who immediately appealed to a higher court.
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important factor for long hours of work is that Japanese workers are given 
less paid leaves in a year and furthermore do not use up all the entitled paid 
leaves. The average number of entitled paid leaves for Japanese workers is 
about 18 days, similar to that for American workers but significantly lower 
than about 25-30 days for European workers. While European workers typi-
cally use up all the entitled paid leaves and American workers 70-80%, 
Japanese workers take only half. Since firms’ purchase of unused paid leaves 
is banned by law with the aim of preventing firms from forcing workers to 
work without proper rest, unused paid leaves are, as it were, just a waste. 
An often-cited reason for not exercising workers’ right is that superiors at 
workplaces are not quite cooperative in letting their subordinates take paid 
leaves. Workplace culture seems against taking paid leaves.
All the same, annual hours worked in Japan has notably declined over 
the past two decades, as mentioned earlier. The reason for the decline is two-
fold: government actions aiming to reduce working hours and economic 
Figure 6   Annual Hours Worked in Major Countries
2,200
(Hours per year)
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
1990
2000
2011
Japan US UK France Germany
(Source) OECD “OECD Factbook 2013”
20 早稲田商学第 437 号
132
conditions. On the policy front, in the late 1980s, the government set out to 
ameliorate Japanese overworking, announcing a policy target of reducing the 
annual hours worked to 1,800 hours from the levels at the time topping 2,000 
hours. In efforts to achieve the target, the government lowered the normal 
weekly working hours from 48 to 40 hours (equal to 8 hours times 5 days) 
beyond which firms have to pay extra overtime pays to workers, and it also 
provided some financial incentives to smaller firms to redress overworking.
Another reason for the decline in working hours, perhaps more impor-
tant than policy actions, is the protracted economic weaknesses after the 
bubble bust. Slower production activities resulted in shorter overtime work. 
In addition, as discussed earlier, the stagnant and sometimes volatile eco-
nomic conditions encouraged firms to increase non-regular workers at the 
expense of regular workers as a way to increase flexibility in employment. 
To the extent that the working hours of non-regular workers are shorter, the 
average hours worked has shortened.
Thanks to policy efforts and economic conditions, the 1,800 hours target 
was met in 2002. Working hours have further declined to 1,700-plus hours in 
the past recent few years.
(Overworking and karoshi)
Average figures often mask wide variations and the statistic of average 
working hours is no exception. Although the average annual working hours 
of all workers have significantly declined, some workers, who for the most 
part are regular workers, still toil for very long hours. In the past few years, 
9-10% of workers worked for over 60 hours a week. Overworking is more 
marked among young male workers, and indeed 18-20% of male workers in 
their thirties slog for over 60 hours a week. Note that the weekly hours 
worked for a full-time worker doing no overtime is 40 hours, so that working 
for over 60 hours a week means that weekly overtime work exceeds 20 
hours. The traditional culture of long hour work which seems still entrenched 
at many workplaces hinders workers from achieving work-life balance.
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Sadly, many workers are compelled to work like a dog to the detriment 
to their health, getting very sick or even dying because of overwork. Karoshi 
or death by overwork in Japan has, all too ignominiously, become an English-
language term. Karoshi cases are not necessarily occurring at some obscure 
firms paying little attention to workers’ health. Even some big household-
name firms have caused karoshi in recent years. In the recent five years 
from 2008 to 2012, some 120 workers per year died of karoshi, according to 
the number of karoshi cases in which the government decided to pay com-
pensation benefits for work-related casualties to bereaved families. Besides 
those deceased, many more have been suffering serious illness like heart 
attacks, cerebral hemorrhage and mental disorder.
Regular workers generally have such niceties as job security, lifetime 
employment and seniority-based wages, albeit in less prominent ways lately. 
However, some of them are patently under heavy pressure to work beyond 
limits. Changing the deplorable workplace practices causing extreme over-
working is no easy task. One fundamental approach is to lower the boundary 
between regular and non-regular workers. If the gap in work conditions 
between the different job categories is smaller and the labor market is more 
flexible, there would be little need for hard-pressed hapless regular workers 
to work themselves to death out of fear of losing their prized regular-worker 
status.
3.  Women at Work
(Making up for the shrinking working-age population)
The labor force in Japan is set to decline as the working-age population 
aged 15-64 will shrink in a big way. Note that the labor force is persons par-
ticipating in the labor market, that is, those having jobs (employed) plus those 
looking for jobs (unemployed). According to demographic projections by an 
authoritative government research institute, the working-age population will 
fall by as much as some 30% by 2040 from the 2010 level, and will further 
decline down the road. As a result, the ratio of the working-age population to 
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the elderly (65+), which in effect measures how many younger adults support 
one elderly person, will be down to 1.5 in 2040 from 2.8 in 2010 and 7.4 in 
1980.
To avoid putting onerous burdens on the young, efforts to increase 
income or boost economic growth are of vital importance. One way to do so 
is to moderate the decline in the labor force, if all but impossible to stem it. 
To that end, it is particularly important to promote greater labor force par-
ticipation among the elderly and women. The growing need for the elderly to 
stay at workplaces as long as possible was as discussed earlier. Lifting up 
female labor participation is no less important. Another way to cope with the 
shrinking labor force is to entice foreign workers. The situations and issues 
concerning working women and foreign workers in Japan are the topics in 
this section and next.
(Working women and child rearing)
Generally, a large share of Japanese women are working at workplaces 
rather than staying at home. Here the labor force participation rate, namely 
the ratio of people in the labor market (either employed or unemployed) to 
the working-age population (aged 15-64), is a useful gauge. The labor force 
participation rate of Japanese women was 69% in 2012, largely comparable 
with that in other major advanced countries but Italy where the labor partici-
pation rates of both men and women are low. However, the gender gap in 
labor force participation is large in Japan. The labor force participation of 
Japanese men was 94% in 2012 so that the gender gap was some 24%, while 
the gender gap in other major advanced countries (but Italy again) was 
around 10%⑾. To sum up, Japanese women as a whole work at workplaces 
as much as in other major advanced countries, but their participation in the 
labor market is much lower than Japanese men.
─────────────────
⑾　The labor participation rate of Japanese men is in fact the highest among major advanced 
countries.
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Part of the reason for the lower female labor force participation is that 
many young women in child-bearing and ‒raising ages exit from the labor 
market. As a result, the female labor force participation rates by age groups 
look like the letter M, namely, there is a dent in the middle (see Figure 7). 
This feature unique to Japan’s labor market has come to be known as the 
M-shaped pattern of female labor force participation by age group. The 
M-shaped pattern reflects the withdrawal of many women from the labor 
market at the time of first child birth and their later return to workplaces.
In other major advanced countries, there is no such a dent in the female 
labor force participation by age. In particular, working women in the U.S. and 
major European countries continue to work whether they have small children 
or not. By contrast, many working women in Japan leave the labor force to 
care for children, and start working again, all too often in other firms, once 
their small children reach school ages. In recent years, there have been some 
Figure 7   Working Women by Age
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sings for change in Japan’s peculiarity concerning young working women. As 
Figure 7 shows, the M-shaped pattern has become less pronounced over the 
past decade, with the dent in the middle flattening. For all the recent smooth-
ing in the M-shaped curve, the tendency for young women in their thirties to 
drop out from the labor market still remains.
This tendency tends to work against women’s earning ability. Knowing 
women more likely to quit at mid-career than men, firms are less inclined to 
provide women with the same training they routinely offer to men, lowering 
the chances for women to accumulate human capital. Women employed as 
regular workers prior to quitting for child care more often than not become 
part-timers or other types of non-regular workers when they return to work. 
Thus wages tend to be lower than the case in which they would have contin-
ued to work at the same firms.
A major reason for women to exit the labor force is that affordable and 
high-quality nurseries are in short supply particularly in Tokyo and other big 
cities so that young mothers have to care for their own children at home. It 
is difficult to open up new nurseries meeting all the regulatory requirements 
for the safety and quality of services. The nurseries meeting the require-
ments are authorized by the government and eligible for public funding, 
while non-authorized nurseries, while not illegal, have to finance themselves 
all with fees from parents. The government has been promoting the estab-
lishment of child daycare facilities. Yet, the demand for childcare still far 
exceeds the supply of facilities in urban areas, resulting in long waiting lists 
for admittance⑿. Given the limited availability of nurseries, the government 
has recently mandated by law all firms to provide one year’s unpaid leave for 
child care with guarantee of return to the same jobs⒀.
─────────────────
⑿　The excess of demand over supply occurs because fees charged by authorized nurseries are 
set by the government. The intended aim is to provide safe, good quality services at affordable 
prices. It is not illegal for private firms to open up unauthorized nurseries which charge much 
higher fees than authorized ones.
⒀　The Child Care and Family Care Leave Law was enacted in 1991 and strengthened in 2012. 
This law also covers the need for workers to care for their frail elderly family members
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(Still a male-dominated world of business)
Japan had long been a society of male chauvinism until half a century or 
so ago. In the world of politics, female suffrage was introduced when the 
world war II was over. At workplaces, women’s role has steadily been 
expanding over the past several decades. The traditional concept of family 
was that men were bread-earners and women stayed home taking care of 
their families. Now, two thirds of adult women have jobs, either part-time or 
full-time, and the country’s production activities are much reliant on the 
female workforce. Many women now receive higher education and compete 
with their male counterparts at workplaces. The share of girls going to four-
year universities has measurably risen to 46% in 2012 from 12 % in 1980. For 
comparison, this share for boys was 56% in 2012, up from 39% in 1980.
Japan has come a long way in terms of women’s role at workplaces. Still 
women remain, for the most part, the supportive labor force, while men domi-
nate managerial positions. Many women work as part-timers and other non-
regular workers, and their wages and fringe benefits are generally low. 
Female regular workers getting promoted to managerial positions and above 
have recently been increasing, but a marked gender gap in promotion and 
wages remains. The deck remains stacked against women, and it appears as 
if the glass ceiling for women in this country is far thicker than in other 
advanced countries.
Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) reported in 
2012 that women accounted for only 4.6% of senior staff (above division chief 
levels) at its member firms. Likewise, women are underrepresented in com-
pany boardrooms. The share of women in boardroom membership at publicly-
traded firms was 3.9% in 2009 (see Figure 8). In that year, it was 18.1% in 
France and 12.0% in the U.S., while boardrooms in Germany were as much 
male-dominated as in Japan. In Japan, there is no female CEOs at the coun-
try’s biggest firms. By contrast, in the U.S., there are many female CEOs at 
top-notch firms like IBM, PepsiCo, Hewlett-Packard and DuPont, to mention 
just a few.
26 早稲田商学第 437 号
138
In an effort to redress the gender gap, the government enacted the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Law in 1985 (and amended it for strength-
ening in 1997). It is now illegal for firms to have sex-differentiated policies for 
hiring, training, promotion and retirement. Although the law does not provide 
for penalties against non-compliance, it seems to have positive effects on the 
corporate mindset and firms’ personnel policies.
Yet the gender gap is hard to narrow down, partly because it is often 
fiendishly difficult to determine in practice when unequal treatment consti-
tutes sex discrimination. For instance, it is a very difficult task in practice to 
judge whether promoting a male worker rather than a female counterpart is 
based on performance-related traits or gender bias.
In addition, in an attempt to dodge the infraction of equal-treatment 
requirements by law, many large firms now have instituted two career 
tracks which new hires of both genders are to choose at the time of job inter-
views. The first-tire track called Sogo Shoku (meaning comprehensive jobs) 
Figure 8   Women in Company Boardrooms
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could lead to senior managerial positions and is mostly dominated by men 
with some exceptions of women. The second-tire track called Iippan Shoku 
(meaning general jobs) is primarily meant for women doing supportive jobs. 
A critical difference between the two career categories is the possibility of 
workplace changes either domestically or internationally. For instance, first-
tire employees working in a Tokyo office may be asked to work in an office 
or factory in Hokkaido or Bangkok, while second-tire employees are guaran-
teed no workplace change. Most university-educated female workers prefer 
the second-tire track because workplace changes would be hard once they 
get married and have children. Whereas there are clear differences in wages, 
promotion and training between the two career tracks and therefore between 
men and women, firms are able to argue that such differences are not gen-
der-based and the choice of career tracks is up to new hires.
Indeed, an age-old habit dies hard. However, there have been some signs 
for change lately. For example, a group of female workers, who were second-
tire employees, sued their employer Nomura Securities, Japan’s biggest 
investment bank, for their unfair treatments in promotion and wages vis-a-vis 
male coworkers. In 2004, after a long-drawn-out court battle, they won a 
court-recommended settlement with the firm, securing promotion and obtain-
ing monetary compensations. Another example concerns female part-timers. 
Large superstore chains have started to promote their part-timers to store 
managers. More efforts must be made to change the social mores favoring 
men over women at workplaces. After all, women’s fuller participation in the 
labor force is badly needed to lift up the Japanese economy in the long haul.
4.  Foreign Workers in Japan
(Limited roles of foreign workers)
Another way to make up for the decline in the working-age population is 
making good use of foreign workers. Japan’s policy on naturalization is tradi-
tionally very restricted. It is indeed quite difficult for foreigner nationals to 
acquire the Japanese citizenship unless they are married with Japanese 
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nationals. This, foreigners wishing to work in Japan apply for the status of 
residence or residence permits, retaining their foreign citizenship.
Foreign workers play a very limited role in Japan, accounting for only 
1% of the country’s labor force (see Figure 9). By contrast, other major 
advanced countries have much higher shares of foreign workers in the labor 
force: 6-9% in Europe and 16% in the U.S.⒁.
Foreign workers with proper legal status were some 680 thousand in 
2012, while illegal foreign workers were some 67 thousand. The number of 
illegal workers is estimated from the number of foreigners whose visa status 
(often tourist visa) is already expired. They are presumed to be working 
─────────────────
⒁　Foreign workers here do not include illegal foreign workers. Notably, the U.S. has a large num-
ber of illegal immigrants estimated to total over 10 million.
Figure 9   Foreign Workers in Major Countries
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somewhere in the country. There used to be more illegal workers, but in 
recent years they have significantly declined in number, thanks to the gov-
ernment’s stepped-up efforts for apprehension.
Among foreigners working legally in Japan, the Chinese account for the 
largest share (43% in 2012), followed by Brazilians, Filipinos, Koreans and 
Peruvians (see Figure 10). As will be discussed below, workers from Brazil, 
Peru and other Latin America are granted a special status for working in 
Japan.
The country’s policy regarding foreign workers is to welcome skilled 
workers and to allow unskilled workers to work in Japan only on exceptional 
bases. The reality, however, is that a large majority of foreign workers is 
unskilled. In determining who are skilled, the government enumerates a few 
dozens of professional fields such as investment/corporate management, 
legal/accounting, medical, research and education. Foreigners qualified as 
Figure 10   The Composition of Foreign Workers
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professionals in the listed fields are granted residence permits. Those skilled 
workers accounted for only 18% of legal foreign workers in 2012.
The remaining are basically unskilled workers. First, there is a large 
group of unskilled workers from Latin America, mostly Brazil and Peru. That 
is because the government allows the second and third generations of Japa-
nese emigrants to South America to work in Japan without any restrictions 
as to what jobs they take and how long they stay. Second, unskilled workers 
from developing countries are allowed to work as trainees at firms for a 
maximum of three years. Most of those trainees are from China. The third 
large group of unskilled workers is foreign students doing part-time jobs. The 
rest of legal foreign workers include a variety of categories like foreigners 
who are spouses of Japanese nationals, working-holiday makers and foreign-
ers working as maids for foreign diplomats. In addition, there are tens of 
thousands illegal foreign workers who are presumably doing unskilled jobs 
underground.
(Wooing foreign talent)
As the working-age population further dwindles in the coming decades, 
inviting foreign workers is even more important. Both the supply of unskilled 
workers from poor countries and Japanese industries’ demand for them as 
cheap labor are strong. However, any proposition to open a wider door for 
unskilled workers would be unlikely to garner popular support, since most 
Japanese remain quite leery of accepting unskilled foreign workers for fear of 
rising crime and the erosion of social coherence.
Foreign workers equipped with higher skills help generate higher 
incomes in Japan. In an attempt to entice foreign talent, the government has 
taken measures to relax conditions on professional qualifications, yet foreign 
professionals have not much increased so far. It appears as if they shun 
Japan, and Japan seems to be losing the global war for talent. Since there is 
no single solution for winning this war, Japan must make a wide variety of 
efforts to increase foreign talent.
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The government needs to make it even easier for foreign professionals 
to work in Japan. For instance, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have in 
place the points system in which applicants with advanced skill sets are 
assigned points based on educational attainment, incomes and other skill indi-
cators and those earning points higher than a certain level are invited as 
skilled workers. Japan has recently adopted a similar points system. To date, 
however, Japan’s new points system has not yet been successful in wooing 
foreign talent, and thus changes are needed to make the points system more 
attractive to foreign professionals⒂.
It is also important to make Japan’s economy more vigorous because a 
growing economy attracts more skilled workers from abroad. A wider use of 
English language at firms and universities may be helpful, because English-
speaking foreign professionals could work in Japan without Japanese 
language skills. A recent notable development is that Rakuten, the country’s 
biggest online retailer, has recently adopted English as its only language in 
office, though such a bold move is still rare.
Another way to expand skilled foreign workers is to attract more foreign 
students studying at Japanese universities, because some of them choose to 
stay and work in Japan after graduation. Much to its disappointment, Japan 
lags behind other advanced countries on this score as well. In particular, the 
ratio of foreign students at higher education institutions (mainly universities) 
in Japan was 4% in 2009, significantly lower than in other major countries 
despite its government’s generous spending on grants for foreign students⒃. 
─────────────────
⒂　Japan’s points system introduced in 2012 is applied to high-level professionals such as research-
ers, technology experts and corporate managers. Certain points are assigned to an applicant 
according to educational attainment, years of residence in Japan, age, annual incomes and Japanese 
language skills. If the total acquired points exceed 70, the applicant is granted a special status as 
high-level professional that comes with benefits like an easier access to a permanent residence per-
mit and the right to bring in domestic maids or parents for child care. The number of applications 
for the first year of the new point system was disappointingly low. The government needs to 
change the way to assign points and make benefits more attractive to foreign professionals.
⒃　In 2008, the ratio of foreign students at higher education institutions was 6% in the U.S., 12% in 
Germany, 12% in France, 27% in Britain and 33% in Australia.
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Many universities are now increasing courses taught in English in an effort 
to attract more foreign students. Needless to say, keeping higher academic 
standards is vitally important to attract the best and the brightest from the 
world.
The demand for nursing care for the elderly has been expanding, yet 
qualified workers are in short supply. The current scheme to invite care pro-
viders from neighboring countries is as yet unable to expand them in a big 
way. Stepped-up efforts are needed.
In sum, Japan needs to boldly change its own system on many fronts, or 
risk falling further behind other countries in the global war for talent.
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